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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews elements of the conflicts about siting of large 
industrial facilities, particularly energy facilities, in the western 
United States. The paper concludes that generic concerns about the need 
for and economics of major energy facilities have become as important as 
site-specific impact considerations, and that these generic concerns 
tend to make ambiguous what most project sponsors have traditionally 
seen as clear-cut guidelines for facility siting. The paper suggests 
that currently evolving changes in economic and energy policy are 
creating a yet different climate for facility planning, in which many 
















When industrial development requires the use of large amounts of 
land in areas where dominant land uses have been agricultural or 
recreational, conflicts are inevitable. The introduction of an airport, 
power plant, mine or synthetic fuel facility into such areas will cause 
permanent damage to some resources and temporary damage to others, and 
will force many surviving resources —  and human communities —  into 
different, more complex relationships with changed physical, cultural 
and economic environments.
The process of weighing the damages and negative changes that might 
be caused by industrial development against a project’s benefits and 
positive changes has always been difficult. Much of the power of local 
government, and an increasing amount of power vested in the state and 
federal governments, has been established to broker conflicts among 
private interests, and between private interests and various publics, 
over benefits and costs of competing land uses. Government action at 
all levels has led to many fairly well defined processes and standards 
for evaluating proposed industrial sites.
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Political and economic developments of the past fifteen years have 
greatly diminished the utility of these rules. Technical compliance 
with site-specific environmental standards, and the demonstration of 
positive local economic impacts, no longer assure a receptive response 
from state and federal regulators and land managers. Particularly in 
the west, where government agencies exercise considerable discretion 
about how best to use federally owned lands, the judgement of land 
managers and regulators has been influenced by broader considerations: 
the opinions of agricultural interests, environmental and consumer 
groups, governors, key state and federal legislators, Indian tribes, and 
others with policy or political concerns.
For the most part, industry has been 6low to understand and accept 
this change. As a result, billions of dollars in planned investments 
have been delayed or cancelled because of failure to site and plan 
properly, or failure to effectively advocate projects that do comply 
with sound environmental, economic and social standards but are opposed 
for other reasons. Other projects, more responsive to changed 
circumstances, have moved expeditiously through the new regulatory 
environment.
Now, additional changes are taking place that are making the energy 
facility development process even more complex, but at the same time are 
creating new opportunities for some developers. Many regulators and 
much of the environmental community are as slow and reluctant to 
understand these new changes as was industry in responding to the 
changes of almost two decades ago.
A
SITING: EMERGENCE AS A NATIONAL ISSUE
Increased Influence of Environmental Interests
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, three proposed developments 
resulting from cooperation between government and industry stimulated 
concerted, national opposition from organized environmental interests. 
Indeed, these proposals —  a dam in the Grand Canyon, the world's 
largest airport in the Everglades, and the Trans Alaska Pipeline —  
helped shape the present structure, goals and tactics of the national 
environmental community in the United States. Each conflict involved, 
from the environmental perspective, defense of natural values within 
undeveloped, largely federally-owned lands against proposals to site 
facilities that, as proposed, posed serious threats to the natural 
environment. Each required disparate national and local environmental 
interests to form coalitions, to attempt to develop new kinds of legal, 
technical and economic competence, to display increased determination to 
educate and influence their own members, the press and the government, 
and to become participants in economic development decisions that 
previously had been the exclusive province of business, labor and
government.
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Each conflict resulted in abandonment or modification of the 
proposed project. Equally significant, each conflict led to policy 
changes with impacts felt far beyond the boundaries of the sites 
in question. Federal inter-agency disputes over the Everglades jetport 
helped prompt the late Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) and other 
Congressional leaders to enact the Nations] Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). Later, litigation over the inadequate initial Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) for the Trans Alaska Pipeline demonstrated that 
NEPA must be honestly complied with, or federally-approved projects 
would face delay. The Grand Canyon dam conflict had a more complex 
result: stimulation (with initial support from the environmental leaders 
who stopped the dam), earlier than would otherwise have occurred, of 
major coal-fired plants in the Southwest to supply California’s then 
apparently insatiable appetite for electricity.
Of greatest interest, for purposes of this analysis, was the 
general result for siting policy: at a time when the growth of the
national environmental community was encouraged by many other issues, 
environmentalists were forced, by the course of events, to develop a 
special interest and political competence in conflicts over siting.
The environmental sector thus became prepared to actively participate in 
national siting policy just as an international crisis —  the Arab oil 
embargo of 1973 —  made energy, and energy facility siting, issues of 
paramount national importance.
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Industry and Government Raise the Stakes
By the time concern about the Arab oil embargo reinforced industry 
worries about the timely siting of energy facilities, siting questions 
had already begun to grow beyond specific conflicts. Although Congress’ 
brief flirtation with national land use planning in the early 1970's, 
led again by Sen. Henry Jackson, was described as environmental 
legislation, the proposed bills were actually designed to encourage 
states to preempt the ability of local governments to oppose major 
energy facilities. The legislation died, partly because of opposition 
from anti-planning interests that rejected or failed to understand 
utility industry siting concerns, and partly because key environmental 
leaders quitely but effectively opposed the legislation.
Again, a major policy consequence of that debate was the impact on 
some of the most active national environmental organizations: increased
interest in siting as a policy issue, not just as a project-specific 
question centered on individual development proposals. Industry leaders 
seeking to further centralize the role of government in approving major 
facilities failed, and their attempt to do so elevated the issue on the 
agenda of the environmental community.
Unhappily, during a time when rational analysis of energy and
energy siting needs would have served the nation well, and a time,
coincidentally, when interests skeptical about claims in behalf of new
energy development became influential in national policy, energy
development proponents in government and industry created expectations 
and fears that led to even more intense conflict.
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In today’s climate, with industry making highly visible efforts to 
encourage energy conservation, and displaying a post-Watt understanding 
that concern about environmental protection can not be ignored, it may 
be difficult to understand the importance of the conflicts that were so 
prominent from 1970-1976 (and that flared again from 1981-1983).
OPEC oil price increases and the Arab oil embargo shocked the world 
economy, and gave energy policy a more prominent place on the U.S. 
political agenda. Industry and government reaction to the economic and 
national security implications of more costly, less reliable world oil 
supplies produced some predictable but very unproductive consequences: 
among them, a national debate about energy production and facility 
siting that created unrealistic expectations among energy developers, 
and stimulated even stronger opposition to some energy developments.
Development proponents projected highest-case scenarios for energy 
production and conversion. Early reports such as the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation's North-Central Power Study, and later documents produced by 
a succession of federal energy agencies, predicted the construction of 
hundreds of large new coal-fired and nuclear power plants, synthetic 
fuel plants, and oil refineries, accompanied by a massive expansion of 
coal, uranium, shale and offshore oil production. Government and some 
industry leaders spoke glibly about the need for economic activities of 
considerable regional importance in many parts of the U.S. —  farming, 
ranching, commercial fishing —  to make way for the obviously more 
important energy industry. The magnitude of damage to existing values
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in the West was predicted to be so great that one federally-commissioned 
study suggested that some regions might simply have to be declared 
’’national sacrifice areas.”
At the same time, energy development proponents in government and 
industry projected strongly negative attitudes about two issues, energy 
conservation and environmental protection, that enjoyed support from 
most of the American public. Energy production proponents reacted to 
energy conservation, and to environmental protection, as if these 
policies were alternatives to, rather than conditions of, continued 
expansion of energy production.
The stage was thus set for an interesting period of conflict. When 
the Ford Foundation published a thoughtful study suggesting that energy 
conservation could moderate the growth of energy use without diminishing 
economic productivity, many oil and gas industry leaders denounced the 
study as subversive nonsense. The federal government’s energy policy 
manager (one of many to hold that unenviable post during the past 
several years) reflected the U.S. auto industry’s belief and proclaimed 
that no matter how costly gasoline might become, Americans would never 
become attracted to 6mall, fuel-efficient cars, and should not be 
encouraged to do so.
The mining and utilities industries persuaded two successive 
administrations to oppose federal legislation requiring the reclamation 
of lands strip-mined for coal, more careful economic management in the 
sale of federally—owned coal to private mining companies, environmental
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have given the federal government unprecedented power and influence over 
local and state land use and economic development decisions.
In the end, a strange coalition defeated the federal siting bill. 
Environmentalists, some industry leaders who believed the legislation 
was unnecessary and unworkable, and political conservatives opposed to 
greater centralization of federal authority, prevailed over those in 
industry who hoped to use expanded federal power to overcome local or 
state objections to their projects, and over federal political figures 
who wanted to demonstrate they were doing something about the energy 
crisis.
The Abstract and Particular Converge 
For industry, the prolonged debate had a very negative consequence: 
the genuine individual projects proposed during this period were judged 
not simply on their own merits, but as symbols of the larger development 
and policy agenda being promoted by industry advocates. Consumer and 
environmental critics, by this time, had begun to analyze not only the 
specific environmental and economic consequences of individual projects, 
but also to challenge the basic credibility of industry and federal 
policy analysis. Maps showing the combined projections of trade 
associations and federal agencies called for so many energy facilities 
in the West that the Northern Plains and Rocky Mountain states, from 
Montana to New Mexico, appeared filled with proposed new sites. On the 
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts, the prospects of exporting U.S. coal 
to Europe and the Orient brought forth plans for development of new coal 
terminals wherever rails or barges could link the coal fields to the
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protection and monitoring during production of off-shore oil, and 
planning to protect agricultural and wildlife uses of federally-owned 
lands when mining takes place. At the height of these debates, a 
leading mining industry spokesman, asked about the impact of greatly 
expanded coal strip mining on wildlife and agriculture in the West, said 
"We never promised you a rose garden."
The important environmental legislation was passed —  one bill 
became law after the Congress over-rode a Presidential veto during the 
Ford Administration, others attracted so much Congressional support that 
enactment took place in spite of White House opposition, and the surface 
mining reclamation legislation, after twice being vetoed by President 
Ford, became law in the first year of the Carter Administration.
But the transition from Republican to Democratic control of the 
White House included an ironic surprise for environmental interests: 
while the Republican leadership had resisted enactment or enforcement of 
individual energy-related environmental laws, the White House under 
Presidents Nixon and Ford showed little interest in bringing federal 
authority to bear on the siting of non-nuclear facilities. It was the 
Carter Administration, with strong support from key Democratic leaders 
in the House and Senate, that supported enactment and enforcement of 
laws to protect the environment —  but worked vigorously to neutralize 
those laws where they (or state and local regulations) might interfere 
with the siting of energy facilities. President Carter’s proposed 
Energy Mobilization Board (EMB), lacking even the planning 
window-dressing of Senator Jackson's earlier land use proposals, would
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coastline, with total projected capacities far beyond even the most 
imaginative coal export scenarios. Each proposed port or plant or 
mine, of course, was essential to the survival of the American economy.
This boosterism, with the hope of federal subsidies, or federal 
intervention against environmental and planning standards, made it seem 
possible for every entrepeneur, any community to promote a nationally 
important energy center. Energy development took on the porkbarrel 
character —  and the visibility — normally associated with the 
politically equitable distribution of federal transportation or defense 
spending.
Those in the energy business who found customers, and proposed to 
open mines or powerplants, build transmission lines or pipelines, 
operated in an increasingly difficult regulatory climate. Regardless 
of the merits of individual proposals, the sponsors* credibility as an 
industry was doubly diminished. The overwhelming number of facilities 
called for at the national level either could not be believed, in which 
case an individual project sponsor’s justifications were also suspect, 
or might be given some credence, in which case the project was just the 
first wave of a full-scale assault on the regional environment. In 
either case, the nature of the siting debate had changed. While local 
impacts were not unimportant, individual projects were also judged on 
their relationship to the Issues of need for such a project. So the 
need issue, first raised by development proponents to stimulate federal 
subsidies or federal regulatory intervention, turned individual siting 
conflicts into more abstract policy debates.
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Looking at three proposals during the 1970's to construct large 
coal-fired generating plants in the Southwest that would have supplied 
power to California, it is possible to see the development of the need 
issue as an element of individual debates, and to see a relationship 
between the importance of the need issue and the extent of conflicts 
over site-specific environmental problems. During the conflict over 
the proposed Kaiparowits project in southern Utah, opponents questioned 
the need for the plant, but those arguments were secondary to the more 
politically effective arguments about protection of the outstanding air 
quality in nearby National Parks. The subsequent debate over the Allen- 
Warner Valley project in Utah and Nevada —  which, as was the case with 
Kaiparowits, was abandoned by its sponsors after a lengthy regulatory 
battle —  was stimulated by conflicts (impacts on vistas from Bryce 
Canyon National Park) over the project's proposed coal supply, but 
ultimately dominated by a sophisticated argument about need for the 
project. Opponents turned state and federal reviews of the project into 
a broad debate over California energy policy.
Yet in the case of Intermountain Power Project, an even larger 
California-sponsored power plant being proposed in Utah at the same time 
as the Allen-Warner Valley project, the need question was not part of 
the debate, because all environmental objections to the facility were 
muted after federal, state and company officials cooperated to move the 
project away from a site in southern Utah to a less sensitive location 
elsewhere in the state. Indeed, when, after all federal and state 
approvals had been obtained, the size of the IPP project was cut in 
half, the reduction took place not because of objections from the
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environmental groups so concerned about California energy planning, but 
at the insistence of a Utah investor-owned utility with a minority 
ownership in the project.
ENERGY FACILITY DEVELOPMENT TODAY 
New Rules, New and Changing Players
It is now understood by most participants that the nature of energy 
facility siting debates has changed. Proponents, regulators and the 
public must weigh not only the traditional issues, but complex questions 
about the economy’s need for the proposed services from the facility, 
and whether, if that need exists, it might be better satisfied through 
alternative technologies. Government, and through government the 
public, now have the ability to influence not just where a facility 
should be built, but what kinds of facilities, if any, should serve our 
energy needs. Government influence over energy industry investment 
decisions is not new. There has not been, since the inception of the 
organized energy industry, a genuinely market-driven decision process. 
National policy, federal and state economic incentives, the impacts of 
tax laws, have always favored some segments of the industry more than 
others. Now, new rules, stimulated by state officials and environmental 
and consumer groups, are contributing to other changes in the way energy 
investment decisions are made. But the consequences are not entirely 
those anticipated by their authors.
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The electric utility industry* becsuse of its economic structure, 
has been the most scrutinized and regulated segment of the energy 
industry. The existing regulatory regime made it easier for new ideas 
to be imposed on the utility industry than on other sectors of the 
energy business. As an example, Congressional efforts in the 1970's 
(authored by Ralph Nader, opposed by environmental interests) to 
establish a federally-owned oil exploration company failed. The 
proposals were viewed as unecessarily intrusive into an activity 
where private enterprise had always been responsible for investment 
decisions. Yet, although most Americans purchase their electricity from 
investor-owned utility companies, Congress acted with enthusiasm to 
change the ways in which electric power is financed, owned, produced and 
distributed.
While there were many motives, and multiple interests, supporting 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), the merger of 
consumer and environmental interests that made enactment of PURPA 
possible resulted from one primary objective: a belief on the part of
most environmental leaders that PURPA would encourage alternatives to 
traditional central-station electric generating plants, and thus reduce 
the number of sites demanded by the utility industry. This, in turn, 
would reduce the impact of the utility industry and its fuel suppliers 
on water supply, air quality, public safety, wildlife habitat and 
recreation areas. The environmental strategy was fruitful. Alternative 
cogeneration power sources, subsidized by high consumer prices required 
by federal and state laws, are filling needs that otherwise would be met 
through expansion of utility production capacity. Late 1970's
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environmental responses to the siting excesses presented by industry 
advocates in the early 1970’s are, in the 1980's, contributing to a 
restructuring of the U.S. electric power industry.
Consumer and Environmental Interests: New Changes
As noted earlier, one source of strength for critics of energy 
industry plans during the 1970’s was a coincidence between environmental 
and consumer interests. As it happened, many of the most visible and 
environmentally objectionable proposals from energy developers were also 
extraordinarly costly —  so costly, and so inefficient in the market 
place, that only federal subsidies could give them a chance of success. 
Apart from the high per-unit cost of energy to be produced by these 
subsidized processes, it became apparent that some energy industry 
leaders and their advocates in government thought it necessary to keep 
the price of all energy high, in order to better justify the high cost 
of synthetic fuels. From the time of former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger’s management of the U.S. government's response to the Arab oil 
embargo, through the policies advocated by the Carter Administration's 
energy czar James Schlesinger, keeping world (and U.S.) oil prices up in 
order to stimulate a market for high-priced oil shale, coal gasification 
and coal liquefaction was considered essential.
The economic irrationality of so much of the energy industry's 
agenda made it easier for the industry's environmental critics to be 
politically credible in economic, as well as environmental, attacks on 
many proposals —  or at least more credible than industry advocates.
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But for the national environmental organizations, energy economic issues 
were, and remain, difficult to address. Obviously, fewer synthetic 
fuels plants would be sited if federal subsidies were removed. But some 
groups wanted more environmentally benign systems to get tax subsidies, 
and a few proponents of solar energy have been willing to accept 
subsidies for synthetic fuels in order to get federal solar dollars.
The same climbing energy prices that stimulated energy conservation also 
encouraged synfuel developers. Conserving supposedly scarce natural 
gas by prohibiting its use by the electric utility industry stimulated 
more interest in coal-fired powerplants.
For more than a decade, the environmental community was able to 
avoid reconciling 6ome of the apparent contradictions in its approach 
to fuel choices, subsidies and high energy prices, because no matter 
what coincidence might be found between environmental interests and the 
use of higher energy costs and subsidies, the industry itself had been 
so visible in the promotion of high-cost energy that consumers and 
public blamed the industry for rising energy prices.
Recently, however, changes in energy prices and in the economy have 
made it more difficult for the assumptions of the 1970’s to continue 
unchallenged.
As an example, for several years advocates of cogeneration were 
able to escape serious scrutiny of the consumer cost implications of 
substituting cogenerated power for power provided by utilities. The 
co-generated power could be subsidized by forcing utilities (and their
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consumers) to pay independent power producers somewhat under the cost of 
what a regulatory body would determine to be the "avoided" cost, a high 
percentage of the cost the utility would have to pay for expanding its 
own production capacity. With avoided costs pegged to the cost of the 
highest priced utility plants, cogenerators producing power at much 
lower prices could be assured of getting high prices and a guaranteed 
market for their product. But between the even higher cost of other 
power available to the utilities, and the small percentage of 
co-generated power in a utility’s system, the relatively high-priced 
cogenerated power has not, until recently, appeared to affect the 
economics of electric power.
Now, extremely high amounts of high-priced cogenerated power are 
becoming, in some jurisdictions, the largest source of additional power. 
In addition to concerns about costs, regulators are reviewing the 
stability implications of dependence on such unexpectedly large amounts
of cogenerated electricity. While many cogeneration proposals are
sound
sound, many others appear to be made more^because of the availability of 
tax and price subsidies than because of long-term interest in energy 
production. Changes in the tax laws, reductions in subsidies, or even 
investment recovery under existing tax laws could leave a significant 
amount of cogenerated electricity produced by firms with little interest 
in long-term maintainence of efficient systems.
A period of falling oil prices, the effective end of subsidies for 
synthetic fuels, and deficit-induced pressure on government revenues and 
spending have changed the policy climate for energy, environmental, and
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economic issues. The changed policy situation does not suggest that 
long-standing support from consumers and the general public for 
application of environmental standards —  even costly environmental 
standards —  is eroding. Political and industry leaders who have, from 
time to time, attempted to invoke the interest of the consumer in order 
to relax environmental standards have not been found credible, because 
public support for environmental protection continues to be strong.
What does appear to be happening is a more widespread acceptance 
that the economic consequences of energy and natural resource policies, 
including those advocated by the environmental community, must be better 
understood. Where the economics of a policy appear questionable, and 
the environmental benefits could be achieved with less economic 
disruption, the environmental benefits themselves may not be enough to 
win support for a particular environmentalist-sponsored approach.
The most dramatic illustration of this change is in the failure of 
acid rain proposals advanced by the environmental community. Because 
advocates of cleaner air favored legislation that would advance Midwest 
and Appalachian high-sulfur coal interests over western and Appalachian 
low-sulfur coal interests, at a high dollar cost, with no environmental 
benefits from the regional favoritism, the legislation was stalemated.
Similarly, in spite of overwhelming public and Congressional 
support for strong and costly measures to clean up dangerous toxic waste 
sites, the inability of Congress to effectively address the issue of 
narrow or broader-based industry responsibility for financing the 
cleanup blocked passage in 1985 of Superfund legislation.
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What Is Happening Now?
It Is always easier to look back and attempt to explain the past 
than to understand the importance of current events, but some Issues are 
emerging as indicators of present trends. Most important, and now 
almost universally acknowledged, is that the electric power business, 
for decades one of the more stable, predictable elements of our economy, 
is changing rapidly and will change even more during the next few years.
The nature of this change makes it essential for those who hope to 
understand or influence electricity policy to recognize that traditional 
assumptions —  even very recently developed assumptions —  must be 
constantly reviewed and challenged. The unique insight of five years 
ago may be this year's useless conventional wisdom, and next year's 
counterproductive, stubborn mythology.
One of the profound changes resulting from events of the last few 
years is a near reversal of role of the market in non-utility and 
utility thinking about investment in new electric power facilities. For 
years, environmental and consumer groups were concerned that utilities 
had incentive to invest in new facilities, whether needed or not, 
because of guaranteed returns on investments approved by regulatory 
bodies.
Now, in most jurisdictions, it is the non-utility cogeneration 
investors who are guaranteed that someone —  the utilities and their 
consumers —  must pay them a certain price for producing electric power.
The utilities themselves operate in the opposite environment: clear
signals from regulators that there is little assurance that utility 
investment in new facilities can be recovered from ratepayers. As a 
result, some utilities that do face increased growth in the 1990's are 
looking now at non—traditional, market—oriented•options, considering new 
projects that would not be placed in a power producer’s rate base, but 
would be funded with all development risks born by investors. Others 
are taking a wait-and-see attitude, knowing that investments should be 
made, but waiting until regulators themselves acknowledge the need and 
provide assurance that the investments will be held reasonable before 
taking any steps to develop future capacity.
The long-term implications of this situation will be interesting. 
From an environmental perspective, environmentalists have moved from 
conflicts over dams in the Grand Canyon, to disputes over coal-fired 
power plants, to stimulation of more small-source air and water 
pollution, groundwater waste injection, and dams on many previously 
naturally-flowing streams. How will the problem of regulating pollution 
from hundreds or thousands of small, marginal enterprises, made 
temporarily profitable through consumer and tax subsidies, compare to 
the consequences of applying modern combustion and control technologies 
to a small number of large central-station power plants? How will 
political and regulatory perspectives change in cases where power 
producers favored by environmental groups depend more on guaranteed high 
prices and guaranteed markets, while utilities or their large-scale 





Most site-specif1c environmental aspects of facility siting are, or 
can be, well understood. It must be assumed that a project which would 
degrade a National Park, violate air or water quality standards, or 
damage important wildlife habitat is not likely to survive the 
predictable opposition from environmental groups and federal or state 
regulators. Few energy developers are now willing to risk corporate 
time and resources on such ventures.
For most projects, conflict will come not because of failure to 
comply with legal requirements, but because of failure to understand the 
more ambiguous questions raised by a project’s intrusion into the 
existing environment. Debates about individual projects will continue 
to be influenced by broader policy issues, particularly regarding the 
public's views about the need for a proposed facility. Local citizens 
and the environmental community do not, and should not, concede that 
whatever is not prohibited is always permitted.
Neither, however, should it be assumed that the environmentalists* 
criticisms and strategies which were valid in the 1970’s are necessarily 
effective in planning for siting in the 1990’s. Responses to the abuses 
which created existing hazardous waste sites may not provide sound 
guidance for working now to address future waste Issues, and may even 
frustrate the introduction of superior technologies for controlling 
hazardous wastes. In the energy area, policies that once protected 
consumers and the environment by stimulating more diverse approaches to
power generation and use may now actually retard the reliable 
incorporation of the best fuels and technologies into electric power 
systems, and may create genuine conflicts with the interests of 
consumers. Even in the energy use area, is the forced introduction of 
marginally economic cogeneration capacity into a system significantly 
less a substitute than central-station power for investments in more 
efficient energy use? The public interest community, regulators, and 
industry would benefit from a 'reevaluation of all parties' assumptions 
about the economic, technological, and regulatory aspects of industrial 
siting.
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